This paper investigates whether moral status talk gets us anywhere in our search for answers to questions in the ethics of marginal cases. I consider the usefulness of moral status talk first on the assumption that an individual’s possession of moral status is not a further fact about that individual, and then on the assumption that it is. Finally, I offer an expressivistic interpretation of mo...

This study analyzed the relations of two dimensions of moral cognition (i.e., acceptance of moral transgression and moral disengagement) and two forms of status in the peer group (i.e., social preference and perceived popularity) with bullying and defending among 235 primary-school children and 305 middle-school early adolescents. Social status was tested as a moderator of the associations betw...

Being human implies a particular moral status: having moral value, agency, and responsibility. However, people are not seen as equally human. Across two studies, we examine the consequences that subtle variations in the perceived humanness of actors or groups have for their perceived moral status. Drawing on Haslam's two-dimensional model of humanness and focusing on three ways people may be co...

This paper presents arguments for two claims. First, post-persons, beings with a moral status superior to that of mere persons, are possible. Second, it would be bad to create such beings. Actions that risk bringing them into existence should be avoided. According to Allen Buchanan, it is possible to enhance moral status up to the level of personhood. But attempts to improve status beyond that ...

Responding to several leading ideas from a paper by Allen Buchanan, the present essay explores the implications of genetic enhancement for moral status. Contrary to doubts expressed by Buchanan, I argue that genetic enhancement could lead to the existence of beings so superior to contemporary human beings that we might aptly describe them as post-persons. If such post-persons emerged, how shoul...

No one is naive enough to expect that all moral beliefs are universal. Today, some countries legally beat and imprison homosexuals, and others recognize gay marriage; in some places, killing a bull is a sport, and, in others, it is an abomination; in some places, corporal punishment is the obligation of a responsible parent and, in others, grounds for forced removal. Indeed, the burden of proof...

Some people contend t h a t fetuses have moral s ta tus but less t h a n t h a t of paradigm persons. Many people hold views implying that sent ient animals have moral s t a t u s but less t h a n that of persons. These positions suggest tha t moral s ta tus admits of degrees. Does it? To address this question, we must first clarify what it means to speak of degrees of moral status. The paper b...

DeGrazia argues that post-persons have as much justification in believing that they have higher moral status than persons as persons have in believing that they have higher moral status than animals. DeGrazia's claim presupposes that what Buchanan calls the "moral equality assumption" is false. This article argues that DeGrazia has given us no reason to disbelieve the moral equality assumption....

Th is paper defends a qualifi ed version of moral vegetarianism. It defends a weak thesis and, more tentatively, a strong thesis, both from a very broad basis that assumes neither that animals have rights nor that they are entitled to equal consideration. Th e essay’s only assumption about moral status, an assumption defended in the analysis of the wrongness of cruelty to animals, is that senti...